How to fight the war on terror without an adversary

OF COURSE, even in the new Afghanistan there was no such thing as a free lunch. In return for privileged access to American dollars, Sherzai delivered the one thing US forces felt they needed most: intelligence. His men became the Americans’ eyes and ears in their drive to eradicate the Taliban and al-Qaeda from Kandahar.
Yet here lay the contradiction. Following the Taliban’s collapse, al-Qaeda had fled the country, resettling in the tribal regions of Pakistan and in Iran. By April 2002, the group could no longer be found in Kandahar — or anywhere else in Afghanistan. The Taliban, meanwhile, had ceased to exist, its members having retired to their homes and surrendered their weapons. Save for a few lone wolf attacks, US forces in Kandahar in 2002 faced no resistance at all. The terrorists had all decamped or abandoned the cause, yet US special forces were on Afghan soil with a clear political mandate: defeat terrorism.
How do you fight a war without an adversary? Enter Gul Agha Sherzai — and men like him around the country. Eager to survive and prosper, he and his commanders followed the logic of the American presence to its obvious conclusion. They would create enemies where there were none, exploiting the perverse incentive mechanism that the Americans — without even realising it — had put in place.
Sherzai’s enemies became America’s enemies, his battles its battles. His personal feuds and jealousies were repackaged as ‘counterterrorism,’ his business interests as Washington’s. And where rivalries did not do the trick, the prospect of further profits did. (One American leaflet dropped by plane in the area read: ‘Get Wealth and Power Beyond Your Dreams. Help Anti-Taliban Forces Rid Afghanistan of Murderers and Terrorists.’)
For several hours a day in a small Kandahar office, special forces and CIA officers pored over intelligence reports from the field, almost all of them originating from Sherzai’s network. They worked closely with the head of the local spy agency, a Sherzai crony named Hajji Gulalai. An ex-mujahed, he had been tortured so badly by the Communists that he had acquired a skin condition for which an aide had to constantly scratch and massage his back.
With such a history, your list of enemies ran long, and the Americans knew it. According to former special forces soldiers, the two sides had an informal pact. ‘He’d give us intel,’ explained one, ‘and then we’d let him do whatever he wanted.’ A group of soldiers in a special forces detachment wrote in a collective memoir that on operations, Gulalai’s men ‘could get into places and exact payback for something that had nothing to do with their mission.’ They added, ‘It happened a few times. The detachment had a deal with him.’
Whatever they had been before, Sherzai and his men were now creatures of a world where, as the Bush administration had proclaimed, you were either with us or against us. Sherzai’s network fed intelligence — which in the absence of an actual enemy was almost all false — to the Americans, and reaped the rewards: a business empire strung across the desert, garish villas abroad, and unfettered control of southern Afghan politics. The Americans, in turn, carried out raids against a phantom enemy, happily fulfilling their mandate from Washington.
Amid this bounty, Sherzai’s operatives homed in on one place in particular: a district not far from Kandahar city that they nicknamed ‘Dubai,’ a reference to the port metropolis of shopping malls and palm trees that represented, for Kandaharis, an oasis of unbridled wealth and opportunity. For Sherzai’s men, their new land of opportunity, their new Dubai, was none other than the impoverished desert district of Maiwand.

‘Success’ in Maiwand
HAJJI Burget Khan and the other captives were brought to KAF and deposited in metal cages stacked side by side in the open air and flooded by bright white lights. They were forced to kneel there for hours, their hands bound behind them. Some passed out from the pain. Some lost sensation in their hands and feet. Then they were marched into a room and made to strip and stand in front of American soldiers for inspection, inspiring a humiliation that, in the Pashtun ethos, was difficult to even imagine.
‘When they made us walk naked in front of all those Americans,’ captive Abdul Wahid later told a reporter, ‘I was praying to God to let me die. If someone could have sold me a poisoned tablet for $100,000, I would have bought it.’
In a final act of emasculation, soldiers appeared with clippers. One by one the captives’ beards were shorn off, and many of them broke down in tears. Some, for resisting, had their eyebrows removed as well.
Hajji Burget Khan, tribal leader and war hero, would not be seen alive again. The truth of what happened in his final hours may never be known. One account has it that he died en route to KAF from his gunshot wound. Another version, a confidential dispatch from the Canadian Joint Task Force 2, part of the special forces team that carried out the raid, states that ‘an elderly father died while in custody’ at Kandahar Airfield, ‘reportedly from a butt stroke to the head, which has caused much grief/anguish in the village.’
For days, the prisoners were questioned. ‘We don’t know who we have, but we hope we got some senior Taliban or at least some Taliban folks in there,’ lieutenant colonel Jim Yonts, spokesman for the US Central Command, told reporters. Yet it soon became apparent that the captives had all followed Burget Khan in embracing the new American order. After five days, they were brought to Kandahar’s soccer stadium and released. A crowd of thousands, who had made the trip from Maiwand, was there to greet them. A few months earlier many of these farmers had packed the stadium seats waving the new Afghan flag and chanting in favour of the coming loya jirga. Now, for the first time, anti-American slogans filled the air.
‘If we did any crime, they must punish us,’ shouted Amir Sayed Wali, a villager elder. ‘If we are innocent, we will take our revenge for this insult.’ Tribal elder Lala Khan asked, ‘Is there any law? Any accountability? Who are our leaders? The elders, or the Americans?’
The raid would leave lasting marks on a number of levels. ‘If they touch our women again, we must ask ourselves why we are alive,’ declared villager Sher Muhammad Ustad. ‘We will have no choice but to fight.’ Back in the village, one woman was heard shouting at her male relatives, ‘You people have big turbans on your heads’ — the quintessential accoutrement of Pashtun manhood — ‘but what have you done? You are cowards! You can’t even protect us. You call yourselves men?’
Hajji Burget Khan’s son, wounded in the raid, was left wheelchair-bound. Burget Khan’s close friend Tor Khan, who had been shot four times, died a slow, agonising death. Villagers did not take him to the hospital for nearly 24 hours, fearing that the Americans would find him and finish the job. Six-year-old Zarghuna, fast asleep when the soldiers arrived, awoke in a panic and, searching for her parents, fell into a well shaft. It took hours for her parents to find the body. ‘She was the laughter of the house,’ her mother said.
American officials declared the mission ‘definitely a success.’ As major AC Roper explained, ‘It’s all a coalition effort to help rid this country of people that stand against peace and stability.’ Roper’s confidence was grounded in intelligence indicating that Hajji Burget Khan had been meeting with senior Taliban leaders. That charge, it turned out, was true, but only in the most literal sense: he had been trying to convince the Talibs to support the Karzai government. The brief against him had been written almost entirely from the accusations of Sherzai and his allies. ‘Burget Khan was too independent,’ said Hajji Ehsan, a member of the Kandahar government. ‘He was independently popular and Sherzai saw him as a threat.’
In the weeks following the killing, Ishaqzai tribes people from around the country descended on Maiwand to pay their respects. The large Ishaqzai community in Pakistan staged angry protests. In the years to come thousands would be killed on all sides, but it would be the memory of Hajji Burget Khan’s murder that villagers would never relinquish.

Resurrecting the Taliban
THE men of Band-i-Timor were no strangers to tragedy, and as the summer came they returned to their fields, gathering at the mosque on Fridays to talk about the work and the rains and the future. Then, one morning in August, three months after the death of Burget Khan, they learned that US forces had raided Maiwand again, this time arresting the entire police force — 95 officers — in one precinct. The government announced that the captives were ‘al Qaeda-Taliban.’
Locals were mystified. ‘They were part of the government,’ said the police chief of a nearby station. ‘The government paid for their salaries and food. I don’t understand how they could do this.’ The policemen had, in fact, been appointed by Hajji Bashar, the Noorzai elder who had worked so assiduously to win support for the new government. Within days of the arrests, a new police unit took over the precinct — all of them Sherzai’s men. Meanwhile, the captured policemen in US custody were beaten, some of them suffering broken ribs, and stripped of their possessions, only to be released eventually, with the government spokesman admitting that officials ‘never had hard evidence’ of a connection to militants. Instead, the spokesman acknowledged that ‘these people were all tribesmen of Hajji Bashar and very loyal to him.’
The mood in Band-i-Timor continued to harden. If the government could do this ‘to their own people,’ said Amanullah, a storeowner, ‘then there is no guarantee they won’t come after regular people. No one is safe from this.’ Some weeks later, US forces stormed Band-i-Timor once again, this time detaining Hajji Nasro, a local leader and supporter of Hajji Bashar who had also allied with the new government.
The noose was tightening around Hajji Bashar himself. At first he had met regularly with US military and intelligence officials. The goal, he later told a reporter, ‘was to make the situation in Afghanistan stable and also to help the Americans negotiate with moderate members of the Taliban to reconcile with the government.’ But now the writing was on the wall: the Americans were not fighting a war on terror at all, they were simply targeting those who were not part of the Sherzai and Karzai networks. Bashar fled with his family to Pakistan to wait for the dust to settle.
Bashar’s story might have ended there, if not for his unquenchable ambition to land a position in the Afghan government. By 2005 he would rekindle contacts with the Americans, this time through a private company working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Over tea in a series of meetings in Dubai and Pakistan, he opened up about some of his business activities in hopes of winning Western backing for his political aspirations.
US officials, however, had other plans. Bush administration officials had drawn up a list of the most wanted international drug barons who posed a threat to US interests. When Assistant Secretary of State Bobby Charles saw it, he asked, ‘Why don’t we have any Afghan drug lords on the list?’ This was, in fact, a thorny problem, because some of the biggest Afghan narcotics kingpins — Gul Agha Sherzai and Ahmed Wali Karzai, the president’s brother, chief among them — were allied with Washington, and in some cases even paid by the Americans. Finally, US officials settled on a name: Hajji Bashar. He was a small-time player on a list of heavyweights, and potentially valuable to Washington as a peace broker, but political expediency sealed his fate.
Bashar was lured to an Embassy Suites hotel in New York City. For days he spoke with officials from the US Drug Enforcement Agency on intelligence matters, sharing meals and tea. When they finished, he was — to his astonishment — handcuffed and read his rights. A trial on drug charges followed, and he is now serving a life sentence at Brooklyn Metropolitan Detention Centre.
The Noorzais and Ishaqzais, the two largest tribal populations of Maiwand, had lost key leaders, both of them bridges to the Americans, and now the communities felt cut adrift. ‘We felt decapitated,’ said elder Kala Khan. ‘How could we convince our people that the Americans were our allies after this?’
As the seasons turned, the raids continued. Band-i-Timor was also the home of Akhtar Muhammad Mansur, former head of the Taliban air force, who had retired and offered his backing to the new government. Watching the violence unfold, he repeatedly approached government officials, pledging his support to anyone who would listen. Finally, learning that he was on the American target list, he, too, fled to Pakistan. Unlike Hajji Bashar, however, he abandoned reconciliation. Years later, he would become one of the leaders of the Taliban insurgency.
To the Americans, Sherzai’s ‘intelligence’ rang true because the tribes populating Maiwand had supported the Taliban when the movement first appeared. But the exigencies of the war on terror meant that US forces were unable to recognise when those same tribes switched allegiances in 2001 — which is precisely what made Maiwand so lucrative in Sherzai’s eyes. There were weapons to be requisitioned, tribal elders to be shaken down, reward money to be collected — boundless profits to be made. For Sherzai and his allies, it was indeed the New Dubai.
Once, when soldiers had come through Band-i-Timor, locals would smile and call out in greeting, but now they only watched in silence. People started carrying weapons again. The raids continued and villagers began fighting back, and that meant some people were caught in the middle. Soon, for many there was no choice but to leave.
Whole villages decamped to Pakistan, deserting their fields, returning to refugee camps. It was a development that officials in Kandahar city could not ignore, but they insisted that it was a necessary evil in the fight against terror. ‘Sometimes, the best way to catch a fish is to drain the pond,’ said Khan Muhammad, a high-ranking security official.
What if, however, there were no fish to begin with?
TomDispatch, April 5. Anand Gopal, a TomDispatch regular, is the author of the just-published No Good Men Among the Living: America, the Taliban, and the War Through Afghan Eyes (Metropolitan Books).  He reported on the Afghan war for the Wall Street Journal and the Christian Science Monitor and is now a fellow of the New America Foundation.